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This paper introduces a tractable model of health insurance with both moral hazard
and adverse selection. We show that government sponsored universal basic insurance
should cover treatments with the biggest adverse selection problems. Treatments not
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Surprisingly, the cost effectiveness of a treatment does not affect its priority to be covered
by basic insurance.
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1. Introduction
This paper considers a health insurance system where the government sponsors universal basic
health insurance and private parties offer voluntary supplementary insurance. The question we
analyze is: which treatments should be covered by insurance and how (i.e. basic vs supplemen-
tary insurance)?
A well known intuition is that basic insurance can battle adverse selection problems but
not moral hazard. In the words of Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000, pp. 588): “Moral hazard is a
significant concern in insurance policies but it is not one that necessarily argues for government
intervention. Government insurance policies ... may engender just as much moral hazard
as private insurance policies”. Universal basic insurance by being applied to everyone can
overcome adverse selection. This reasoning implies that basic insurance should cover treatments
that suffer most from adverse selection. However, the literature on cost effectiveness analysis
(see, for instance, Drummond et al., 2005; Gold et al., 1996, for overviews) suggest that the
government should give priority to treatments that give the highest health gain per euro spent
and cover these by basic insurance.
To analyze this question, we extend the Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) (RS) insurance model
to include moral hazard and a number of different treatments. We show that a welfare maxi-
mizing government covers treatments by basic insurance where the adverse selection problems
are biggest. Neither moral hazard nor (surprisingly) cost effectiveness affect the priority of a
treatment for coverage by basic insurance. That is, moral hazard plays no role in whether (ex-
tensive margin) or how a treatment should be insured. Co-payments for a treatment increase
and hence insurance decreases (intensive margin) if it suffers more from moral hazard. We
come back to cost effectiveness in the conclusion. Further, the analysis shows that efficient
health care consumption is not necessarily welfare maximizing. And the generosity of basic
insurance is affected by whether or not the government can force private insurers to set efficient
co-payments.
The reason to combine public and private insurance is given by the imperfections in the
private health insurance market (Blomqvist, 2011; Zweifel, 2011). Public and private health
insurance can be combined in a number of ways. We consider the case where private insurance
is bought to cover treatment for conditions that are not covered by public insurance. One can
think of dental care, physiotherapy and prescription glasses that are not covered by the public
insurance system. But, also, the public system may not fully cover the costs of a treatment and
people can insure the public co-payment on the private market. Examples of this combination
of public and private insurance include the Netherlands (after 2006), France and Luxembourg
(Mossialos and Thomson, 2004, pp. 39-41). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“Obamacare”) is also a move in this direction. Ten essential health benefits categories are
defined that need (at least) to be covered by health insurance. It is left to the states to define
which treatments within these categories will be covered exactly (McDonough, 2011). People
are free to buy more coverage if they want, but any health insurance contract needs to cover
at least the basics.1 So which treatments belong to the basics?
1Two other ways in which private and public insurance can be combined are the following. First, private
insurance may substitute for public insurance. That is, people are either covered privately or publicly. This is the
case in Australia, Ireland, Spain and used to be the case in the Netherlands before 2006 (Colombo and Tapay,
2004, pp. 14). Second, private insurance is bought in addition to public insurance to get faster access (i.e.
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We analyze the case with universal public coverage for a basic insurance package. There is
a fixed budget to finance the public system; hence not all treatments can be covered by basic
insurance. The private market (as in RS) features second degree price discrimination and hence
there are inefficiencies due to selection incentives. The question is: which conditions should
be covered by public insurance and which treatments can be left to the private market? We
denote insurance offered by the private voluntary market: supplementary insurance.2
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, from a technical point of view,
we analyze a two tiered problem similar to DeMarzo et al. (2005) and Faure-Grimaud et al.
(1999). In our case, the government sets parameters for basic insurance which then affect the
equilibrium interaction between insurers and consumers on the private market. The health
insurance context is similar to Bijlsma et al. (forthcoming), but they consider the effects of
risk adjustment in a private insurance market; not the distinction between private and public
insurance.
Second, there is the (health) insurance literature on adverse selection. A seminal paper is
RS: insurers separate customer types by offering efficient insurance for high risk types and a
contract with under-insurance for low risk types. This under-insurance is the inefficiency of the
market outcome. Dahlby (1981) is an early paper showing potential benefits of a combination
of public and voluntary private insurance. However, the analysis in this literature is not done at
the treatment level. That is, it does not answer the question how a treatment should be insured.
Models in this literature generally ignore over-consumption of health care due to insurance.
Third, there is an extensive literature on moral hazard in health insurance. We discuss
this literature under two headings. First, the literature that considers optimal coverage at
the treatment level. This literature does not consider the public-private split of insurance
coverage. Second, we discuss papers that do consider public vs. private insurance, but not at
the treatment level.
The classic result on the degree of coverage at the treatment level is the trade off between risk
sharing and excess demand for the treatment (moral hazard). The co-payment for treatment k
should be higher the smaller the financial risk imposed by k and the more elastic the demand
for k. Pauly (1968) and Zeckhauser (1970) are seminal papers. Using empirical estimates of
demand elasticities for health services, Manning and Marquis (1996) find optimal co-insurance
rates of almost 50%. The literature then moved away from the case of a single health care
service to analyze interdependencies in demand for health care services. Besley (1988) derives
a Ramsey pricing intuition for the optimal co-payment for treatment k. Goldman and Philipson
(2007) argue that if the use of a certain drug saves on hospital costs (substitute treatments),
the optimal co-payment on the drug is low even though its demand may be quite elastic. With
complementary treatments, the optimal co-payment is higher than the elasticity would suggest.
Ellis et al. (2011) extend this idea to multiple states of the world and multiple time periods.
This literature tends to define moral hazard in the following way. Consider a treatment k
that an agent uses if it is covered by health insurance but does not use if she would pay the
full costs of k herself (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2000, pp. 576). Then treatment k is seen as
over-consumption induced by moral hazard of insurance. We show that this definition can be
misleading in the sense that this type of moral hazard can be efficient (in the sense of welfare
shorter waiting lists), have a broader choice of providers and treatments for a given condition. Examples
include Austria, Denmark and Finland (Mossialos and Thomson, 2004, pp. 38/9).
2Sometimes this is called complementary insurance (see Mossialos and Thomson, 2004, pp. 16).
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maximizing).
We conclude with three papers on the split between public and private health insurance.
Blomqvist and Johansson (1997) consider a model with only moral hazard. They show that
a mixed public-private health insurance system is less efficient than a purely private system.
The reason is the externality between the insurance systems: increasing coverage in one system
raises the expected costs in the other system. In our model, the government takes this into
account when designing the public system. Further, in our model the government can repair
another market imperfection: adverse selection. Coate (1995) analyzes mandatory public in-
surance in the light of the Samaritan’s dilemma. Altruistic rich agents give the poor money
to buy private health insurance. The poor underinvest in insurance, hoping that the rich will
help them once treatment is needed (Samaritan’s dilemma). By making insurance mandatory,
the underinvestment in insurance is avoided. Finally, Petretto (1999) analyzes a system with
optimal constant co-insurance rates3 for public and private insurance in a system with linear
taxation. None of these papers answers the question that we are interested in: which treatments
should be covered by public and which by private insurance?
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a model where people buy
health insurance because they are risk averse. Then we explain the basic and supplementary
insurance set up of the model. Section 4 gives the details of the insurance contracts used. Then
we characterize the market equilibrium in the supplementary market. Section 6 derives which
treatments should be covered by basic insurance. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
2. Model with adverse selection and moral hazard
This section presents a model of health insurance: a risk averse agent buys insurance to reduce
consumption risk. The market imperfections are adverse selection and moral hazard.4 We
derive efficient health care consumption and the co-payments needed to get to this efficient
outcome.
2.1. utility
People are risk averse and therefore buy health insurance. We capture this here by using a simple
mean-variance utility structure. Models with both adverse selection and moral hazard tend to
become technical (see for example Laffont and Martimort, 2002, chapter 7) but mean-variance
utility allows a tractable analysis. An agent with expected health v, expected expenditure E(x)
and variance in expenditure V (x) has utility equal to




where r measures the degree of risk aversion. An advantage of mean-variance utility is that
total welfare and efficiency are the same. There are no distributional concerns (as would be
introduced by a concave utility function to represent risk aversion).5
3Much of the moral hazard literature assumes a constant co-insurance rate. That is, the insurer reimburses
a constant fraction of health care expenditure. An exception is Blomqvist (1997).
4We use “moral hazard” here in the health economics sense of excessive care consumption.




The set of conditions (“illnesses”) is denoted K = {1, 2, . . . , κ}. For each condition k ∈ K we
assume that there is exactly one treatment (the one that is most cost effective); also denoted
by k.6 There are two types of agents, denoted h, l. The probability that agent of type j ∈ {l, h}







for each k ∈ K.7 Hence, high risk types have a (weakly) higher probability –compared to low
risk types– that they need treatment k ∈ K. The fraction of θl[θh] types is denoted by φ[1−φ].
We assume that conditions are contractible. That is, a physician can determine whether or
not a patient suffers from condition k and needs treatment k.8 An insurer or the planner can
verify this information. Hence, there is no moral hazard on what treatment is needed. However,
we do consider moral hazard on the intensity of the treatment. Intensity of treatment can refer
to either quantity (like more sessions of physiotherapy) or quality (more expensive/higher dose)
of treatment. Below we refer to treatment intensity as quality. There is a probability ψk[1−ψk ]
(the same for the h and l type, to ease notation) that the patient is in state 0[1]. The utility
gain of the low [high] quality treatment k in state s is denoted by vsk[≤ v̄sk], s ∈ {0, 1}. The
cost of the low [high] treatment equals δk[≤ δ̄k] independent of the state s ∈ {0, 1} and type
j ∈ {h, l}. We make the following assumptions:
v1k = 0
v̄1k − δ̄k > 0
v0k − δk ≥ 0
v̄0k − v0k < δ̄k − δk
(3)
In words, in state 1 only the high quality treatment can cure condition k and doing this is
cost effective (gain in utility exceeds the costs of the treatment). In state 0, the low qual-
ity treatment is cost effective. To illustrate, the low quality treatment can be simply to do
nothing (v0k = δk = 0). Using the high quality treatment in state 0 is not cost effective: the
additional cost (compared to the low quality treatment) exceeds the utility gain. However, a
fully insured patient prefers the h-treatment because v̄0k ≥ v0k. We assume that the patient
can reveal the state 0 or 1 by truthfully reporting her symptoms to her physician. However,
she can also exaggerate her symptoms to qualify for the high quality treatment. Put differ-
ently, whereas we assume that the condition is contractible, the severity of the condition is not
verifiable/contractible.
Equation (3) shows that there is a role for cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis in health insur-
ance. Only treatments where the value v exceeds the cost δ should be covered by insurance.
Although the costs δ of a treatment are fairly straightforward to determine, quantifying the
6We focus on “ex post” treatments. For an analysis of ex ante measures (prevention), see Ellis and Manning
(2007).
7Equation (2) makes sure that high types face a higher variance in health expenditure than low types. This
leads to a consistent ranking of types. See Boone and Schottmüller (2013) for an analysis of the case where
types are not ranked consistently because the single crossing assumption is not satisfied.
8Alternatively, treatment k for a patient suffering from k′ = k yields zero utility.
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benefits v is not so obvious. This is usually done in terms of quality adjusted life years (so-
called, qaly’s). See, for instance, Drummond et al. (2005) and Gold et al. (1996) for methods
to determine the value of treatments.
Although books on CE analysis do not usually distinguish between public and private in-
surance, it seems fair to say that their policy implication is that public insurance should focus
on treatments that are most cost effective.9 In our set up, this implies that basic insurance
should cover treatments k in state s with the highest vsk/δsk. However, proposition 2 below
implies that higher cost effectiveness of a treatment does not raise the priority of this treatment
for basic insurance.
2.3. efficient care consumption
Note that equation (3) allows for a formal definition of moral hazard: health care consumption
that is socially inefficient. In particular, the use of the high quality treatment in state 0. It is this
moral hazard risk of over-consumption that prevents full insurance from being socially efficient
ex post. Note that treatments where the severity is actually contractible can be represented as
having v̄0k = v0k: patients have no incentive to lie about the state s.
We use
Δvk ≡ v̄0k − v0k (4)
as a measure of moral hazard. The higher Δvk, the more treatment k suffers from moral hazard.
We assume that the risks for the different conditions k ∈ K are independently distributed.10
Assume that agent of type j ∈ {l, h} has bought private insurance at premium σ. This insurance
leads the agent to get treatment with utility vsk at social cost δsk in state s of condition k with
out-of-pocket expenditure (co-payment) for the agent equal to csk.
11 Then expected utility of




U jk − σ (5)
with






















where the variance term on the second line follows from lemma 1 in appendix A.12 With proba-
bility 1−θjk, agent j does not suffer from condition k and utility equals vk. With probability θ
j
kψk
agent j suffers from k in state 0; treatment gives utility v0k at out-of-pocket cost (co-payment)
c0k. In state 1, treatment gives utility v1k at co-payment c1k.
9To illustrate, if CE analysis were to seriously advice private insurers, it should address selection issues.
Neither Drummond et al. (2005) nor Gold et al. (1996) have the words “adverse selection” in their index.
10For an analysis of correlated conditions and treatments, see Ellis et al. (2011).
11This is a slight abuse of notation. If ŝ denotes a patient’s report of s, we should write vŝk, δŝk, cŝk. But as
we focus on the case where agents truthfully reveal s, we keep notation “light” by writing s directly.
12In particular, substitute x = c0k, y = c1k, z = 0 and probabilities: ζ = θ
j
kψi, ξ = θ
j
k(1 − ψi) in equation
(A.1).
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Assumption (3) implies that ex post a patient in state 0 (1) should get the low (high) quality
treatment. With an actuarially fair premium, the following inequality implies that also ex ante
it is socially efficient to induce efficient ex post consumption:
(1− θjk)vk + θ
j








(1− θjk)vk + θ
j











2(c0k + (1− ψk)Δvk)
2
) (7)
at c0k = δk for each k ∈ K, j ∈ {l, h}. It is readily verified that equation (7) holds for each
c0k ∈ [0, δk] if it holds at c0k = δk. In words, suppose that there is a co-payment equal to c0k
for the low quality treatment of condition k. Then a planner can decide to minimize the risk
for the agent and set a co-payment equal to c0k for the high quality treatment as well. This
leads to inefficient consumption (as the agent will claim to be in state 1 all the time) at a cost
for society equal to θjkδ̄k. Alternatively, the planner can induce efficient care consumption by
setting the co-payment in state 1 equal to c0k + Δvk. This leads to lower expected costs but
higher variance. Assumption (7) says that ex ante the agent prefers the higher variance and
efficient consumption over the case with inefficient care consumption.
If equation (7) would not be satisfied, a social planner maximizing welfare would not induce
efficient care consumption. That is, from an ex ante perspective it is more efficient to insure
the agent (against higher costs in state 1) than to induce efficient care consumption. Arguably,
in this case there is no inefficient care consumption in a second best sense. Hence, as discussed
in the introduction, the definition of moral hazard used in the health economics literature can
be misleading. Using the high quality treatment in state 0 only happens if it is insured: moral
hazard but actually (ex ante) efficient.
From now onward, we follow the literature and assume that (7) holds for every treatment
k ∈ K: both ex post and ex ante welfare is maximized by inducing efficient care consumption.
Given the current policy emphasis on efficient care consumption this seems to be the relevant
case.13
Equation (7) implies that a competitive supplementary insurance market (without basic
insurance) offers efficient insurance. Indeed, with an actuarially fair premium for each type
(i.e. price equal to marginal cost), consumer value is maximized by offering insurance which
induces ex post efficient health care consumption. Hence, consumers buying insurance prefer
(ex ante) contracts inducing efficient care consumption. However, if full insurance would be
offered (inefficiently) a patient will prefer (ex post) to use high quality treatment in state 0.
2.4. efficient co-payment
As the state is private information for the agent, the efficient treatment choice can only be
induced by having an additional co-payment for the high quality treatment (compared to the
low treatment) that is at least equal to Δvk:
c1k ≥ c0k +Δvk (8)
13Allowing for the case where (7) is not satisfied for some treatments is straightforward in the analysis below
but a bit tedious notation wise. There would then be a set of conditions K ′ where the high intensity treatment
is used in both states 0 and 1. The efficient co-payment for treatments in K ′ would be zero etc. Allowing for
this does not affect the main result (proposition 2) which is based on an envelop argument.
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If the agent in state 0 lies about the state by exaggerating symptoms in order to get the high
quality treatment, she gets utility
v̄0k − c1k ≤ v0k − c0k (9)
Hence, the agent has no incentive to lie about the state.
3. Basic and supplementary insurance
Basic health insurance works as follows. If treatment k in state s is covered by basic insurance,
the cost of this treatment for the market is reduced from δsk to γsk. If a patient is not insured,
she pays γsk when she needs the treatment. An insured patient pays γsk in two parts. First,
as co-payment csk when she uses the treatment and, second, in the form of a (actuarially fair)
premium θjkψsk(γsk − csk) where ψsk = ψk[1− ψk] in state s = 0[1].
With γsk = δsk, treatment k in state s is not covered by basic insurance. With γsk = csk,
treatment k in state s is completely covered by basic insurance (in the sense that no private
insurance is involved).14
Without basic insurance, equation (7) implies that the market offers efficient insurance
(preventing over-consumption in state 0) if exclusionary contracts can be used. That is, an
insurer can exclude a customer from contracting with another insurer. If an insurer cannot
prevent the consumer from contracting with another insurer, the market may not be able to
sustain the efficient outcome. See, for instance, Pauly (1974) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1998)
for an analysis of this case.
We assume that the market can enforce that a consumer contracts with (at max.) one
private insurer. That is, the number of insurers with whom an agent contracts is verifiable in
court. An insurance contract becomes void if it turns out that the agent has contracted with
more than one insurer.
We further assume that
GE the government can enforce co-payments c0k, c1k set by private insurers to induce efficient
health care consumption (i.e. satisfy (9)).
The issue here is that equation (7) is assumed to hold with costs δsk; it does not necessarily
hold with costs γsk < δsk. Within the supplementary market this problem is avoided by
assuming that an agent can contract with one insurer only. However, the point of basic insurance
is that it is not exclusive; the agent is expected to buy supplementary insurance. GE implies
that the government can choose γsk without worrying about efficient health care consumption.
15
This implies that γ0k, γ1k satisfy
γ1k ≥ γ0k +Δvk (10)
The case where GE is not satisfied is denoted GN. Here we follow the GE case. Appendix
A.2 analyzes the case where the government cannot enforce efficient co-payments by private
14If γsk > csk, consumers can buy supplementary insurance to cover the difference γsk − csk (recall from
the introduction that supplementary insurance allows private insurers to cover part of the “public co-payment”
γsk).
15Countries that have regulation like this include Canada, Japan and Sweden (Blomqvist, 2011;
Colombo and Tapay, 2004).
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insurance. The main result (proposition 2 below) holds in both cases. For a given government
budget, with GN basic insurance is less generous per treatment but more treatments are covered
by basic insurance.
4. Insurance contracts
In the market outcome, we consider an equilibrium where insurers compete in bundles. That
is, they offer insurance contracts with coverage for all treatments simultaneously. In particular,
they do not compete in contracts that cover only one treatment. This is a natural choice in
this context for several reasons. First, to prevent that one insurer over-insures the customer
of another insurer we assume that a customer can only buy from one insurer.16 Second, with
second degree price discrimination, an insurer wants to offer a contract targeted at each type
h and l. This is most efficiently done in a bundle. Suppose insurers sell two contracts for each
treatment that consumers want covered by supplementary insurance and each of these contract
pairs is incentive compatible (i.e. l-type chooses one contract and h-type chooses the other).
Then bundling all l-contracts together in contract L and all h-contracts together in contract
H will lead to two contracts that are incentive compatible as well. As incentive compatibility
leads to distortions (under-insurance for the l-type; see below), it may be possible to smooth
distortions in the bundled contract better than in the contracts per treatment (which each
separately needs to be incentive compatible). Hence the insured do not lose and may strictly
gain from the bundled contracts.
Therefore, we focus on the case where each insurer offers two contracts only. One contract
targeted at the l-type and one contract targeted at the h-type. We focus on second degree price
discrimination: insurers cannot risk rate.17 There may be two reasons for this. Either, insurers
lack the information to risk rate at the moment an agent buys insurance. Or, insurers do have
this information but are not allowed to use it; the government imposes community rating in
the supplementary market.
We assume that the supplementary insurance market is perfectly competitive. We follow
the RS definition of the perfect competition equilibrium: (i) each offered contract makes non-
negative profits and (ii) given the equilibrium contracts there is no other contract yielding
positive profits.18
5. Market equilibrium
As is well known (see, for instance, RS), the binding incentive compatibility constraint is
that the h-type should not prefer to buy the l-contract. Since the l-type does not want to
16If insurers would sell insurance per condition and consumers were allowed to mix and match, one would
need to check whether for each such contract there was an overlap with the contract of another insurer to
avoid over-insurance. This would lead to higher transaction costs than is the case where a consumer buys
(all) supplementary insurance from one insurer. Moreover, even in the case where insurance could be sold per
condition there is still an equilibrium in which each insurer only sells a bundle. This can be seen as follows. If
insurer j’s competitors only sell bundles which cover all treatments, j’s best reply is to sell a bundle as well.
17Appendix A.1 considers the case where risk rating is allowed.
18In RS an equilibrium may not exist if the fraction of θl-types is large. This paper does not focus on existence
of equilibrium. Implicitly, we assume that the fraction of θl-types is small enough that an equilibrium exists.
9
mimic the h-type (we check this below), we know from the RS analysis that the contract for
the h-type is undistorted. That is, this contract is efficient. This implies that ch0k = 0 for
each k ∈ K. Further, given that the government wants to induce efficient care consumption,
efficient supplementary insurance implies ch1k = Δvk. The insurance market provides maximum
insurance for h subject to efficient care consumption.
In order to avoid h-types buying the l-contract, the l-contract features under-insurance:
cl0k > 0, c
l
1k > Δvk + c
l
0k for some treatments k ∈ K.
In order to find which treatments should be covered by basic insurance, we need to charac-
terize the equilibrium outcome in the supplementary market. It turns out that for our purposes
we do not need to explicitly solve for the equilibrium in the supplementary market.
First, we introduce some notation. Given that ch0k = 0, c
h
























θhk(ψkγ0k + (1− ψk)(γ1k −Δvk)) (13)
In words, expected utility for h type equals the sum of expected utilities for each condition k




1k are fixed at the efficient level, this is not necessarily the case for the l type.
We define the following vector:
cl = {(cl0k, c
l
1k)}k∈K (14)
For the l-type we have




l, γ)− σl(cl, γ) (15)
where
U lk(c


































0k) + (1− ψk)(γ1k − c
l
1k)) (17)
In order to write down the incentive compatibility constraint for the h-type (ICh), we





l, γ)− σl(cl, γ) (18)
where σl(cl, γ) is the premium given in (17) and
Ûhk (c





























For a mimicking h type, the probability of actually needing treatment k in either state 0 or
1 and paying co-payment cl0k, c
l
1k resp. is given by θ
h
k ; although the premium is based on θ
l
k.
Thus, the gain from mimicking for θh is of the form (θhk − θ
l
k)(γk − ck). Raising co-payment
ck helps insurers to separate the types (as in RS). This is the way that the market deals with
adverse selection problems.
The government has another instrument to battle selection. Reducing the treatment costs
γk by covering the treatment with basic insurance, makes mimicking less attractive. Hence
insurers need to distort less to get separation. This is the welfare gain that the government is
after.
The h type has no incentive to mimic the l type if
Uh(γ) ≥ Ûh(cl, γ) (ICh)
The following proposition summarizes the RS equilibrium for this situation: efficient insur-
ance for the h-type and under-insurance for the l-type. That is, the market offers the l-type its
utility maximizing insurance subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of the h-type.
Proposition 1 If an equilibrium exists in the RS game, it features ch0k = 0, c
h
1k = Δvk for











U l(cl, γ) + ν(Uh(γ)− Ûh(cl, γ)) (20)
where ν denotes the Lagrange multiplier on (ICh) constraint. Premium σ
l is given by equation
(17).
This gives an implicit characterization of the market equilibrium. A more explicit charac-
terization is not straightforward. Fortunately, for our purposes, the implicit characterization
is sufficient to find which treatments should be covered by either basic or by supplementary
insurance.
6. Optimal government policy
Given the equilibrium in the supplementary market, how does the government choose its pa-
rameters of basic insurance γ0k, γ1k to maximize total welfare? Clearly, the government’s choice
of γsk affects the equilibrium outcome in the supplementary market.
19 We assume that the
government has a budget B ≥ 0 that it can spend on basic insurance.




(φθlk + (1− φ)θ
h
k)(ψk(δk − γ0k) + (1− ψk)(δ̄k − γ1k)) (21)
where
γ = {(γ0k, γ1k)}k∈K (22)
19Note that basic insurance here is subsidized (γ0k ≤ δk, γ1k ≤ δ̄k) and hence taken up voluntarily by agents.
Hence, in this model there is no need to make basic insurance mandatory.
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Government solves optimization problem:
max
γ0k≤δk,γ1k≤δ̄ksubject to (10)
φU l(γ) + (1− φ)Uh(γ)− μ(E(γ)− B) (23)
where the utilities of h and l types, Uh(γ), U l(γ), are defined by equations (11,20) and μ denotes
the Lagrange multiplier on the government’s budget constraint E(γ) ≤ B.
Now we can prove the following proposition.












Starting at treatment 1 and then moving to treatment 2 etc. the government sets γ0k = 0 and
γ1k = Δvk. This goes on until the budget B is spent.
The priority for covering treatments by basic insurance is determined by the adverse selec-
tion problems associated with treatments. The difference in risk between types is higher –and
therefore the adverse selection problems are more severe– for treatments k with high θhk/θ
l
k.
The proposition says that such treatments should be financed via basic insurance, not via
supplementary insurance. This is intuitive, as universal basic insurance can mitigate adverse




k is reduced. This relaxes
the incentive compatibility constraint for the h-type (ICh) and hence reduces the distortion of
under-insurance for the l-type. This reduction in the distortion (and hence increase in welfare)
is bigger, the bigger is θhk/θ
l
k.
Second, moral hazard plays no role at all in deciding which treatments to insure nor in the
decision how to insure. A treatment with Δvk = 0 does not suffer from moral hazard at all.
While a treatment with high Δvk suffers from major moral hazard problems. But Δvk plays
no role in proposition 2. As basic insurance is plagued by moral hazard to the same extent as
the supplementary market, this is not a deciding factor in allocating a treatment to either basic
or supplementary insurance. On the extensive margin, moral hazard does not affect whether a
treatment is covered in supplementary insurance either (as all treatments in K are covered by
either basic or supplemantory insurance).
On the intensive margin, a treatment with high Δvk is covered to a smaller extent in both
basic and supplementary insurance. The higher Δvk is, the higher the co-payment in state 1
(equation (8)).
Finally, the value of treatments vsk plays no role at all in the government’s decision which
treatments to cover under basic insurance (except that the high quality treatment is not covered
in state 0). The intuition for this is as follows. Agents can afford any treatment that they want
to buy. All treatments in the set K are “worth it” in the sense that value/utility created is
higher than the cost of the treatment if the intensity is adjusted to the state of the patient (see
(3); treatments where the cost exceeds the utility gain can be deleted from K without loss of
generality). Hence, insurance is only about costs and the reduction in income risk. The value
of treatments plays no role: there is no sense in which treatments with higher CE scores v/δ20
have higher priority to be covered either in basic or supplementary insurance.
20Or equivalently, lower CE ratios, δ/v, measuring the cost per qaly gained.
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7. Conclusion
A number of countries feature a combination of public basic insurance and private supple-
mentary insurance. A model based on moral hazard and adverse selection suggests that basic
insurance should cover treatments that suffer most from adverse selection. This formalizes a
well known intuition that the government can improve the market outcome by solving adverse
selection problems. However, both the government and the market suffer from moral hazard
and hence moral hazard plays no role when deciding whether or not a treatment should be
covered by basic insurance.
The model here suggests that cost effectiveness of treatments plays no role in prioritizing
treatments for coverage in basic insurance. To the extent that we believe that moral hazard and
adverse selection are the main problems in health insurance, this implies that basic insurance
should focus on treatments with serious adverse selection issues. Treatments for chronically ill
come to mind, like people with diabetes, rheumatoid arthritis, Alzheimer, Parkinson etc. The
treatments for these diseases –covered by basic insurance– need to be cost effective. But there
is no sense in which higher cost effectiveness increases the priority for a treatment to be covered
by basic insurance. Basic insurance should cover the treatments where the inefficiencies in the
supplementary market are highest.
In a sense, this is surprising as many governments use cost effectiveness to prioritize treat-
ments for inclusion in basic health insurance (Thomson et al., 2012; Gold et al., 1996; Drummond et al.,
2005). In a companion paper, Boone (2014), we analyze the case where people buy insurance
to guarantee access to care. That is, they face a budget constraint that makes it impossible
to pay for expensive treatments without health insurance. Nyman (1999) is an early reference
stressing the importance of the access to care motive of health insurance. We analyze which
treatments should be covered by basic and which by supplementary insurance in an access to
care model. Then cost effectiveness plays a natural role in prioritizing treatments for basic and
supplementary insurance. Further, in such a model redistributive concerns also affect the set
of treatments to be covered by basic insurance.
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A. Proof of results
The variance term in equation (6) follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider random variable X which takes on the values x with probability ζ ≥ 0, y
with probability ξ ≥ 0 and z with probability 1− ζ − ξ ≥ 0. Then the variance of X is given by
V (x) = ζ(x− z)2 + ξ(y − z)2 − (ζ(x− z) + ξ(y − z))2 (A.1)
Proof of lemma 1 The expectation of X equals
E(X) = ζx+ ξy + (1− ζ − ξ)z
Hence the variance equals
V (X) = ζ(ξ2(y − z)2 + (1− ζ)2(z − x)2 + 2ξ(1− ζ)(y − z)(z − x))
+ ξ(ζ2(x− z)2 + (1− ξ)2(z − y)2 + 2ζ(1− ξ)(x− z)(z − y))
+ (1− ζ − ξ)(ζ2(x− z)2 + ξ2(y − z)2 + 2ζξ(x− z)(y − z))
= ζ(1− ζ)(x− z)2 + ξ(1− ξ)(y − z)2 − 2ζξ(x− z)(y − z)
= ζ(x− z)2 + ξ(y − z)2 − (ζ(x− z) + ξ(y − z))2
Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 1 The proof follows directly from RS. The one thing we need to
check is that θl does not want to mimic θh: U l(cl, γ) ≥ Û l(γ) where Û l denotes the utility
of θl when buying the h-contract. We consider two cases. First, ν = 0: then both contracts
are efficient and l has no incentive to mimic h (in fact, in this case, h will want to mimic l,
contradicting ν = 0). Second, Uh(γ) = Ûh(cl, γ). We show by contradiction that θl does not
want to mimic θh. That is, suppose –by contradiction– that
Û l > U l(cl, γ) (A.2)






























































0k ≥ 0 for each k because
of (8). Hence, we get the desired contradiction if the expression in square brackets is positive.




θψc20 + (1− ψ)θc
2
1 − θ
2(ψc0 + (1− ψ)c1)




where we have dropped superscripts and subscripts where this does not cause confusion. Or
equivalently,
ψc20 + (1− ψ)c
2
1 − 2θ(ψc0 + (1− ψ)c1)
2 ≥ (Δv)2(1− ψ)(1− 2(1− ψ)θ) (A.5)
First, note that the left hand side is increasing in c1:
2(1− ψ)c1 − 4θ(1− ψ)(ψc0 + (1− ψ)c1) ≥ 0 (A.6)
This can be seen as follows. The expression is decreasing in θ. Hence, it holds for all θ ≤ 1
2
(see equation (2)) if it holds at θ = 1
2
: c1 ≥ ψc0 + (1− ψ)c1 which is true because c1 ≥ c0.
Therefore, equation (A.5) holds, if it holds at c1 = c0 +Δv; this can be written as
ψc20 + (1− ψ)(c0 +Δv)
2 − 2θ(c0 + (1− ψ)Δv)
2 ≥ (Δv)2(1− ψ)(1− 2(1− ψ)θ) (A.7)
This holds with equality at c0 = 0. Hence, it holds for all c0 ≥ 0, if the derivative of the left
hand side with respect to c0 is positive:
2ψc0 + 2(1− ψ)(c0 +Δv)− 4θ(c0 + (1− ψ)Δv) ≥ 0 (A.8)
Again note that the left hand side is decreasing in θ. Thus, the inequality holds for all θ ≤ 1
2
if it holds at θ = 1
2
:
2c0 + 2(1− ψ)Δv − 2(c0 + (1− ψ)Δv) ≥ 0 (A.9)
which holds indeed. Hence, equation (A.5) holds and we get the desired contradiction. It
follows that θl does not want to mimic θh. Q.E.D.
Proof of proposition 2 The h-type wants to mimic the l-type, but not the other way
around. Hence we can use proposition 3 in appendix B: we only need to consider the direct


























k. Note that this derivative does not depend
on γsk; that is, W is linear in γsk. Therefore, we get a bang-bang solution where γsk takes on
either the lowest possible or highest possible value. For γ0k this can be written as
1 + φν
Δθk




≥ μ then γ0k = 0
< μ then γ0k = δk
(A.10)
Hence, if the value of reducing γ0k exceeds the cost, μ, of such a reduction, planner chooses the
lowest possible γ0k. If the value of such a reduction is lower than the cost, the planner does
not cover treatment k in state 0: γ0k = δk. When treatment k is the last one before the budget
B is spent, the cost of a further reduction in γ0k equals the benefit exactly when the last euro
of B is spent. In this case, government covers treatment k with probability ρgk ∈ 〈0, 1〉. Its
complement 1− ρgk can be covered by supplementary insurance.
The expression for γ1k is similar to (A.10), except that γ1k = δ̄k if the cost of reducing γ1k
exceeds the benefit and γ1k = γ0k +Δvk if the benefits exceed the costs.
Note that φ, μ and ν in equation (A.10) are the same for each treatment k ∈ K. Hence
treatments k with the highest left hand side in equation (A.10) are covered by basic insurance.




A.1. Third degree price discrimination
With third degree price discrimination, the market outcome does not feature inefficiencies.
Each contract has efficient insurance: c0k = 0, c1k = Δvk. The h-type pays a higher (actuarially
fair) premium than the l-type. But recall that the planner does not care about distribution.
Hence, the planner is indifferent which treatments to cover in basic insurance. Any subset of
treatments that satisfy the government budget constraint is optimal from the planner’s point
of view.
A.2. Efficient care consumption
In the main text, we assume that the government can enforce the level of co-payments csk
set by private insurers. The government then dictates co-payments that induce efficient care
consumption. Here we show that the main result goes through if this assumption is not satisfied.
To motivate this case, note that it may not be straightforward for the government to contract
with insurers stipulating co-payments csk. If insurers would want to over-insure their customers,
they could reduce the co-payment indirectly by insuring events that are correlated with state
sk. Hence here we consider the situation where
GN the government cannot enforce co-payments csk.
Hence γsk has to be chosen such that it is incentive compatible for insurers to set co-payments
in an efficient way.
In particular, in the GN case, setting γsk as in equation (10) does not guarantee efficient
care consumption.
Consider the case where the government reduces the prices of treatment k in basic insurance
to γ0k, γ1k. Then risk neutral insurers can offer insurance that induces (ex post) efficient care
consumption by specifying a co-payment equal to 0 (Δvk) for low (high) quality treatment.
With actuarially fair insurance, the premium for such insurance is given by σ = θjk(ψkγ0k+(1−
ψk)(γ1k −Δvk)). Expected utility is then given by





















k(ψkv̄0k + (1− ψk)v̄1k − γ1k) (A.12)
Hence, in the GN case, the government can only induce efficient care consumption if the ex-
pression in equation (A.11) exceeds (A.12). This is the case if and only if







2(1− θjk(1− ψk)) (A.13)
In particular, if the government sets γ1k = γ0k + Δvk this inequality is not satisfied and the
supplementary market offers insurance that induces over-consumption.
21Note that it is not optimal for the insurer to induce inefficient care consumption while providing less than
full insurance.
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A government that wants to maximize insurance subject to efficient care consumption will
do the following. It sets γ0k = 0, γ1k = Δvk in the GE case. In the GN case it sets γ0k = 0 and







2(1− θjk(1− ψk)) > Δvk (A.14)
Hence the analysis of the GE and GN case is very similar. In the GN case, the difference
between γ1k and γ0k equals Δvk plus a constant. That is, with GN basic insurance per treatment
is less generous (as γGN1k > γ
GE
1k ). Therefore –with a given government budget– more treatments
can be covered under GN.
B. Using the envelop theorem
When we consider the effects of the government’s choice (γ0k, γ1k), we focus on the direct effects;
ignoring the effects of γ on c0k, c1k. This is due to the envelop theorem. However, it may not
be obvious that the envelop theorem can be applied in this context. The following proposition
derives an envelop theorem result in the context of IC constraints. We first introduce some
notation.
Let ui(ci, γ) denote type i ∈ {l, h}’s utility as a function of i’s choice vector ci and parameter
vector γ set by the government. If type j mimics i, j’s utility is written as ûj(ci, γ). Finally, νi
denotes the Lagrange multiplier on j’s IC constraint not to mimic i.
In our model the following assumption is satisfied.





U l(γ) = max
cl
ul(cl, γ)− νl(Uh(γ)− ûh(cl, γ)) (B.16)
Now we have the following envelop result.
Proposition 3 With assumption 1 we find that
dUh(γ)
dγ
=
∂uh(ch, γ)
∂γ
(B.17)
dU l(γ)
dγ
=
∂ul(cl, γ)
∂γ
− νl
(
dUh(γ)
dγ
−
∂ûh(cl, γ)
∂γ
)
(B.18)
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